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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case alleges that Toole County turned plaintiffs land into the functional 
equivalent of a park. Had the County physically seized plaintiffs land and made it a 
park, the County would obviously owe plaintiff compensation. The essence of plaintiff s 
Takings claim is that the County's regulatory actions had the same effect. By precluding 
all economically viable use of the property, plaintiffs land has been set aside for public 
policy reasons, but with the plaintiff being asked to bear the cost. The County may have 
valid reasons for precluding the only possible private use of plaintiff s land, but the effect 
is that plaintiffs property has been rendered valueless because of the County's desire to 
provide a benefit for the general public. This is the precise situation the Takings Clause 
was designed to address. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "One of the principal 
purposes of the Takings Clause is 'to bar Government from forcing some people alone to 
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.'" Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994). 
Defendant's argument, like the trial court's decision, focuses on the fact that Toole 
County had the right to exercise its discretion and deny plaintiffs mining permit request. 
This is an attempt to frame this case as a claim asserting the wrongful denial of a permit 
request. That is not what this case is about. This case alleges that the government's 
regulatory actions, though a proper exercise of its regulatory discretion, constituted a 
"Taking" of plaintiff s property. 
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If defendant's position were correct, the viability of a Takings claim would turn on 
the validity of the government's actions. If the government had the discretion to deny a 
permit request, the logic of defendant's position is that there could be no Takings claim, 
because the property owner would have had no reasonable expectation of using the 
property in the manner requested in the permit. This is, however, the exact opposite of a 
proper Takings analysis. 
Takings claim assume the legitimacy of the regulatory action. In cases where the 
landowner seeks to dispute the legitimacy of the government's actions, plaintiffs bring a 
challenge - usually a due process claim - to the legality of the regulatory action. If the 
regulatory action is found improper, it is reversed, and the plaintiffs get the requested 
permits. Takings claims, in contrast, arise when there is no basis on which to challenge 
the lawfulness of the government's actions. The essence of a Takings claim is that the 
government's actions, even though lawful, had such a substantial impacl on the property 
owner's rights that the government must pay compensation for the impact of the 
governmental regulation. Takings claims focus on the effect of the governmental action, 
the lawfulness of which is assumed. Consistent with this, the relief afforded by Takings 
claims is monetary compensation, not reversal of the government's action. 
Takings claims are much less common than due process challenges to regulatory 
actions, because Takings claims require that the permit denials have a very severe impact 
on the value of the land. A categorical Taking, for example, arises only in the rare case 
in which a regulatory action removes all economic value from land. This case, however, 
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is that rare case. The County's denial of the permit left no alternative uses for plaintiffs 
land. 
This failure to distinguish between Takings claims and claims that challenge the 
validity of the regulatory actions pervades defendant's entire presentation. The vast 
majority of the cases cited by defendant, for example, are due process challenges to the 
validity of a government's regulatory act, not Takings claims. Similarly, defendant 
argues that plaintiff should be required to pursue a state law remedy under Utah Code § 
17-27-1001, a section that deals with challenges to the legitimacy of regulatory actions, 
not Takings claims. 
To understand why defendant dwells at such length on due process cases, rather 
than Takings cases, the Court need look no farther than the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 
2886 (1992). Lucas held that if a regulatory action eliminates all economic use of a 
parcel of property, there has been a categorical Taking and compensation is required. 
This seminal Takings decision is virtually on all fours with the facts of this case, and 
simply cannot be distinguished by defendant. Defendant, however, spends less than two 
pages on this decision, and only after a lengthy discussion of numerous due process cases 
involving challenges to the legitimacy of regulatory actions. 
This reply brief, therefore, will first show that Lucas cannot be distinguished, and 
that defendant has attempted to create a legal argument that avoids Lucas by relying on 
inapposite due process case law. Plaintiff will then address defendant's remaining 
arguments. 
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II. 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S DECISION 
IN LUCAS IS SQUARELY ON POINT 
WITH THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
To briefly review the facts, the plaintiff in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992), bought two residential beachfront lots for 
the purpose of building single-family homes. After the purchase, the legislature passed a 
Beachfront Management Act, and regulations issued pursuant to that Act barred the 
plaintiff from building any habitable structures on his land. The plaintiff acknowledged 
the legitimacy of the legislation, but prevailed on his Takings claim because the trial 
court found that the government's actions rendered the parcels valueless. The Supreme 
Court upheld the Takings claim, ruling that regulatory actions that deprive property 
owners of all economically viable use of their property constitute categorical Takings that 
automatically entitle the property owners to compensation. This is precisely the claim 
made here, that legitimate regulatory action had the effect of depriving the plaintiff of all 
economic value in its land. Under the holding of Lucas', this constitutes a categorical 
Taking, and if proven at trial, compensation must be paid. 
Defendant first tries distinguish Lucas based on the fact that the legislation and 
regulations in Lucas that barred the plaintiffs use of his land were enacted after he 
purchased the property. Defendant argues that this fact distinguishes Lucas from this 
case, because the regulatory scheme at issue here was in place before plaintiff bought the 
property. (Def. Br. at 24) That attempted distinction of Lucas based on the time when 
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the regulatory scheme came into existence, however, has been squarely rejected by a 
subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decision. 
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 121 S.Ct. 2448 (2001), the plaintiff 
owned a parcel of waterfront land. He brought a Takings claim when his development 
proposals were repeatedly denied by the local government because of potential damage to 
a salt marsh. The Rhode Island regulations under which these development proposals 
were denied were even stricter than those at issue here, because landowners wishing to 
fill in a salt marsh needed a "special exception" from a regulatory body that had the full 
discretion to deny all such requests. Id. at 613. 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied plaintiffs Takings claim principally 
because the plaintiff acquired the property after the applicable salt march regulation were 
put into effect. The court reasoned, just as defendant argues here, that since the 
regulations were in effect before he became the owner, "the right to fill wetlands was not 
part of the title he acquired." Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 746 A.2d 707, 716 (R.I. 2000). 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that if a regulation deprives a property owner 
of all economically viable use, there has been a Taking, and it does not matter that the 
regulations were in effect at the time the owner acquired the property. 533 U.S. at 626-
29, 121 S.Ct. at 2462-64. 
Under defendant's line of reasoning, there should have been no Takings claim in 
Palazzolo, because the property owner should have had no protected property interest in 
the construction permit he sought and was denied. The Supreme Court, however, held 
that the sole issue was the effect of the governmental action on the property owner's 
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ability to use his or her property. If it deprives the property of all value, there has been a 
Taking, regardless of whether the regulation was in effect prior to the plaintiffs purchase 
of the property. Defendant's attempt to distinguish Lucas based on the time when the 
regulatory scheme went into effect, therefore, must fail. Indeed, plaintiff cited Palazzolo 
on this very point in its initial brief, and defendant never discusses or attempts to 
distinguish its holding. 
Defendant also tries to distinguish Lucas based on the fact that the plaintiff "paid a 
premium price for the property based upon its beachfront location and the previous 
approval of two residential lots in a [nearby] subdivision...." (Def. Br. at 24) There are 
two problems with this. First, the price the plaintiff in Lucas paid for his lots played no 
role in the Court's decision. Defendant does not cite to any part of the decision or to any 
holding that was impacted by this fact. Second, as defendant acknowledges, plaintiff 
bought the land at issue here solely for the purpose of mining gravel, and was assured by 
a County official that the necessary permit would be granted. Thus, while there is no 
evidence in the record of the price paid, plaintiff obviously paid a price that assumed the 
land's value as a gravel pit. 
Finally, defendant makes the following misleading statement about Lucas: 
the Lucas court noted that regulatory limitations which "inhere in the title 
itself are biding on the purchase of the property. (Def. Br. at 24) 
This is not a fair characterization of the decision or the quoted passage. Lucas is 
quite clear that regulatory schemes that eliminate all economic value in property 
constitute a Taking. Indeed, if regulatory schemes can't cause a Taking, the Lucas 
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decision makes no sense, because it was a regulatory scheme that caused the Taking in 
Lucas. 
The error in defendant's characterization of Lucas arises from the fact that the 
quoted passage was not dealing with legislative regulatory schemes, but rather with 
inherent limitations on property rights that have nothing to do with government imposed 
regulatory schemes. 505 U.S. at 1029, 112 S.Ct. at 2900 ("Any limitation so severe 
cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title 
itself..."). As the Court explained, there might be not a Taking: 
in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire or to forestall 
other grave threats to the lives and property of others. 
112 S.Ct. at 2900, n.16. 
What the Court was pointing out is that there are certain inherent limitations in the 
very ownership of property. These inherent limitations on what it means to own property 
do not constitute Takings because they are never part of the bundle of rights that 
constitutes what property owners have under our legal system. This principle has no 
application here because, by defendant's admission, we are dealing with a discretionary 
decision under a regulatory scheme. 
These points constitute defendant's sole attempt to distinguish Lucas. Their 
failure shows that the trial court, which did not discuss Lucas (although it was 
extensively discussed in the briefs), erred. Under Lucas, the validity of the County's 
permit denial has no impact on a Takings claim. The sole issue is whether the effect of 
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the government's action was to eliminate all economically viable use of plaintiff s land, 
and this is an issue that requires a trial. 
III. 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS A "PROPERTY INTEREST" 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE 
Defendant states that a Takings claim requires a "protectable interest in property." 
That statement is correct. Defendant then argues that plaintiff had no protectable interest 
in a gravel pit permit, and therefore has no protectable property interest on which to base 
a Takings claim. This argument is flatly incorrect. 
Plaintiffs protectable property interest is the fee simple ownership of the land in 
question, and that ownership is an undisputed fact. That interest is the basis of the 
Takings claim. Defendant incorrectly focuses on the permit, when this action involves 
the regulatory Taking of plaintiff s land. 
If defendant's analysis were correct, there would have been no Takings claims in 
Lucas, Palazzolo, or any of the other numerous cases involving regulatory Takings. In 
both Lucas and Palazzolo, landowners sought, but were denied, the right to develop their 
land. In both cases, the government's actions were deemed lawful, and the landowners 
therefore had no "protected interest" in gaining permission to develop their land. Both 
cases involved Takings, however, because the plaintiffs owned property, and it was the 
right to use their property in some economically viable fashion that was taken. 
A good illustration of the flaw in defendant's position is City of Monterey v. Del 
Monte Dunes At Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 119 S.Ct. 1624 (1999), a case in which a 
property owner sued because the City of Monterey had repeatedly rejected his 
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development plans for certain property. The trial court held that the City "did not violate 
[plaintiffs] substantive due process rights because the City asserted valid regulatory 
reasons for denying [plaintiffs] development application." Del Monte Dunes at 
Monterey v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1996). Under defendant's 
logic, this should also have disposed of plaintiff s Takings claim because the developer 
would not have had a protectable property interest in having his application approved. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, affirmed an award in plaintiffs favor under a Takings 
theory because a jury found that the denial of the development plan left the property 
without any economically viable use.1 
The fact that ownership of real property constitutes a protectable interest under the 
Takings Clause is so well established that it is hardly discussed in the case law. For 
example, although a Takings claim requires a property interest, there is no discussion of 
this issue in either Lucas, Palazzolo or City of Monterey. The reason for this is that when 
real property is involved, the existence of a protectable property interest is so obvious 
that it goes unchallenged. 
The question of whether there is a protectable property interest does arise when 
something less than a fee interest in property is at issue. Thus, for example, in Colman v. 
Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that both implied easements and leaseholds constitute protected property interests within 
1
 This plaintiff in City of Monterey purchased the property from another developer after 
many prior development applications had been turned down. 95 F.3d at 1425. This case, 
therefore, also refutes defendant's argument that there can be no Takings claim if the 
regulatory scheme is in place prior to the plaintiffs purchase of the property. 
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the meaning of the Takings clause. In Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful 
City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme court held that property and 
the buildings on that property constitute property interests protected by the Takings 
clause. If easements, leaseholds and buildings constitute protectable property interests 
under the Takings Clause, the actual ownership of property obviously does as well. 
Defendant attempts to fashion an argument that plaintiff had no protected property 
interest based on cases that involve due process challenges to the validity of a regulator's 
rejection of a permit or development proposal. These cases are conceptually 
distinguishable because they focus on whether the landowner had a right to a specific 
development plan or permit, and whether the denial of that specific request was lawful. 
The "property" interest at issue is not the underlying ownership of the land, as it is in a 
Takings claim, but rather the right to proceed with a specific development plan. The 
regulatory action does not eliminate all economically viable use for the land; it merely 
precludes the particular development sought by the landowner. 
Thus, when due process cases talk about the existence of a protectable property 
interest, they are determining whether the landowner had a right - a protectable property 
interest - to proceed with a specific development plan. These decisions have no 
application to Takings claims, which are not concerned with the right to proceed on any 
specific development plan, but rather with the fact that the regulatory action had 
effectively "taken" the underlying property by eliminating all economic use for that 
property. 
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Thus, for example, defendant cites Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council, 226 
F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2000), where a landowner sued to overturn a decision denying it the 
right to develop its property in a certain manner. There was no claim that the decision 
deprived the owner of all economic use of the land, and thus no Takings claim. The sole 
legal claim was that the denial of a particular development plan deprived the developer of 
property without due process of law. The court held that the question of whether a 
refusal to approve a particular development plan violates the due process clause turns on 
whether there existed: 
a set of conditions exist under state and local law, "the fulfillment of which 
would give rise to a legitimate expectation" that the City Council would 
approve Hyde Park's plat. Id. In other words, Hyde Park must show that 
under the applicable law, the City Council had limited discretion to 
disapprove the proposed plat. "Otherwise, the city's decision making lacks 
sufficient substantive limitations to invoke due process guarantees." 
The issue in Hyde Park, therefore, as it is in all due process regulatory claims, is 
whether the property owner had a legitimate expectation - and therefore a protectable 
property interest - of getting a specific plan or permit approved by a regulatory authority. 
It is in this context that courts hold that the question of whether the property owner had a 
protected property interest in a permit turns on whether the regulator had the discretion to 
deny the permit. If the government had the discretion to deny a plan or permit request, 
there is no protectable property interest in that specific request. This has nothing to do 
with a Takings claim in which the denial removed all value from the plaintiffs property. 
It is not uncommon for plaintiffs to plead in the alternative both due process and 
Takings claims in the same case, alleging that the government's actions were unlawful, 
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but if they were lawful, they constituted a Taking. A example of this is City of Monterey 
v. Del Monte Dunes At Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 119 S.Ct. 1624 (1999). As noted 
earlier, the trial court rejected the plaintiffs due process claim because the City had valid 
reasons for denying the property owner's application for a development project on its 
land. Under defendant's legal theory, since the City had the discretion to deny the 
application, there could be no Takings claim because the property owner would have had 
no protectable property interest in having that development application approved. A 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the Takings claim in that case, however, was 
affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court because of a finding at trial that the denial of the 
development application eliminated all economically viable use for the property. 
Another example of the distinction between due process and Takings claims is a 
case cited by defendant, Henry v. Jefferson County Planning Comm 'n, 148 F.Supp.2d 
698 (N.D.W.Va. 2001) (Def. Br. at 17). That case involved the government's denial of a 
request for a conditional use permit to build town homes. Defendant quotes a passage 
from this opinion to the effect that denial of a conditional use permit does not affect a 
protectable property interest. The quoted section, not surprisingly, comes from that part 
of the opinion denying a due process claim based on the rejection of the town home 
development plan. 
Defendant ignores the fact, however, that the plaintiff also brought a Takings 
claim alleging that the permit denial deprived him of all economically viable use of his 
property. The court rejected this claim, but not because there was no property interest. 
Rather, this claim was rejected because: 
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defendants' actions, in allegedly foreclosing the option of rebuilding the 
restaurant and denying Henry's application for a conditional use permit, did 
not deny Henry of all economical use of the Town Run Property. On the 
contrary, the Ordinance expressly permits Henry to operate a farm, single 
family dwellings, mobile homes, markets for the sale of farm products and 
other uses. Therefore, the defendants' actions did not deprive Henry all 
economical use of the Town Run Property. 
Id. at 707-708. 
This once again illustrates the distinction between the two claims. The due 
process claim was denied because the landowner had no right to expect to have the 
conditional use permit approved, or in due process terms, had no protected property 
interest in the conditional use permit. That, however, had no bearing on the Takings 
claim, which was denied because the landowner failed to prove that the permit denial was 
a Taking of his property. One claim focuses on the regulatory action, the other on the 
effect on the landowner's ability to use his or her property. 
Defendant states in a footnote that due process and Takings claims involve the 
same analysis. (Def. Br. at 17, n.5) The only case cited in support of this proposition, 
however, Rocky Mountain Materials & Asphalt Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm *rs of El Paso 
County, 972 F.2d 309 (10th Cir. 1992), addressed only the question of when a claim is 
ripe for court review. The court held that for both due process and Takings claims 
landowners must exhaust any available state administrative procedures. Nothing in that 
decision undermines the very clear distinction between the protectable property interests 
involved in due process claims - which concern the loss of a particular development plan 
- and Takings claims - which concern the effect of legitimate regulatory actions on the 
ownership of land. 
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This, then, explains why the defendant cites so many cases holding that the denial 
of a permit does not involve the denial of constitutionally protected property interest. 
Every cited case for this proposition is a due process decision. Defendants have failed 
to cite a single Takings claim in which a permit was denied, the result of which was to 
deprive a landowner of all economic value in the property, and the court held there was 
no Takings claim because the right to a permit is not a protected property interest. No 
such cases are cited because they do not exist. Ownership of property is the issue in a 
Takings claim, and a permit denial can constitute a Taking if it has a sufficient effect on 
the rights of ownership in that property. 
IV. 
THE COUNTY'S DENIAL OF THE PERMIT 
WAS BASED ON THE MERITS OF THE REQUEST 
Defendant correctly states that property owners must meaningfully pursue 
governmental approval for proposed uses of their property before bringing Takings 
claims. As plaintiff pointed out in its initial Brief, this issue is referred to as ripeness, and 
it sensibly requires a denial on the merits by the regulator before a Takings claim can 
proceed. Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot pursue a Takings claim because plaintiff 
never meaningfully pursued the permit application process: 
2
 The few Takings Clause cases cited by defendant that discuss the existence of a 
protectable property interest deal with whether something other than real property 
constitutes a protectable property interest. See, Maritrans, Inc. v. U.S., 342 F.3d 1344 
(Fed.Cir. 2003) (right to use barges); Mclntyre v. Bayer, 339 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(inmates right to interest on prison trust account); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 
986, 104 S.Ct. 2862 (1984) (environmental data submitted to EPA). 
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Diamond effectively abandoned its conditional use application 
without ever making any real attempt to provide the County with sufficient 
information regarding the potential adverse impacts of a gravel operation at 
that specific site. It did not assist the County in determining what, if any, 
conditions might mitigate those impacts at that particular location. (Def. 
Br. at 21-22) 
Diamond abandoned the application process and forced the adverse 
decision based on the dearth of support." (Def. Br. at 28) 
There is absolutely no basis for this argument in the record, much less a basis for 
contending that this "abandonment" is shown by undisputed facts. The ultimate decision 
to deny plaintiffs permit request was made by the Tooele County Board of 
Commissioners. The statements of the two Commissioners who voted to deny the permit 
requests are the best (and arguably the only) evidence of why it was denied: 
Commissioner White stated his reasoning for being opposed to this is that 
he feels the health and safety of the citizens of Stockton can be in danger if 
that type of thing is put within that short of distance of the housing. "We're 
talking between lA and lA of a mile and lA mile, somewhere in that range. I 
think it would definitely reduce the quality of life of the people whom 
might live there as well. I think the health and safety has a compelling 
interest over the landowner's use...." 
Commissioner Rockwell stated he would echo the same thing. Because of 
the proximity to the Town of Stockton and its citizens, this property is not 
the place to put the gravel pit and related operations. 
(Rec. 160,64). 
These statements show unequivocally that the decision was not based on a failure 
to provide information or an "abandonment" of the application process. Quite to the 
contrary, these two Commissioners confronted the permit request head on, and found that 
they did not want a gravel pit on this location, period. There is nothing further plaintiff 
could have done. 
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Prior to the Commissioners' ruling, the Planning Commission made a 
recommendation to the Commissioners that the permit request be denied. In the Planning 
Commission's report there is a recommendation of a denial on the merits for the 
following reasons, which do not include a failure of some kind on the part of the plaintiff: 
• Professors from the University of Utah had shown that the Stockton Bar 
was a unique "geoantiquity" that should not be disturbed. 
• The County Engineer feared that the mine would disrupt the bar's function 
as an air dam and change the region's climate and temperature. 
• The Mayor of Stockton stated that there would be adverse environmental 
impact on the community. 
• The proposed pit would be located within % mile of a residential area and 
would give off odors and dust. 
• Residents were concerned about numerous health and safety issues. 
(Rec. 161-60, 72; see also, Rec. 77). 
This matter is before the Court on summary judgment. Defendant, therefore, must 
demonstrate that the undisputed facts show an "abandonment" of the permit application. 
Frankly, if there were to be a ruling as a matter of law, it would have to be that the permit 
request was denied on the merits and the Takings claim is ripe. Both the 
recommendation of the Planning Commission and the statements of the County 
Commissioners are unequivocal in denying the request because they did not want a 
gravel pit at this location under any circumstances, and there is no contrary evidence 
showing that the application was denied because plaintiff failed to make a necessary 
showing or in some other way abandoned the application process. For the purposes of 
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this appeal, however, it is sufficient to show that there is no basis for a summary 
judgment ruling against the plaintiff on this point. 
V. 
DEFENDANT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE COURT 
COULD NOT BASE A RULING ON A "FINDING" THAT THE 
PROPERTY HAS OTHER ECONOMICALLY VIABLE USES. 
Plaintiffs reading of the trial court's decision was that that the Takings claim must 
be dismissed for the additional reason that there are other economically viable uses for 
plaintiffs property. Defendant does not attempt to defend this ruling, but rather argues 
that this was a "simple observation" that was "dictum." (Def. Br. at 29-30) In effect, 
defendant is conceding that the summary judgment decision cannot be upheld on this 
basis. This, therefore, is no longer an issue on this appeal. 
VI. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM CANNOT BE ADDRESSED 
THROUGH UTAH CODE ANN. $ 17-27-1001 
Defendant's citation of this statute is another illustration of its confusion of 
Takings claims with due process claims that challenge the reasonableness of regulatory 
rulings. Utah Code § 17-27-1001 allows courts to "determine only whether or not the 
[regulatory] decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." Plaintiff does not claim, 
however, that the denial of the permit was "arbitrary, capricious or illegal." The claim is 
that this lawful denial had a sufficiently devastating effect on the value of plaintiff s 
property such that it constitutes a regulatory Taking under Lucas. 
A proceeding under § 17-27-1001 would require plaintiff to show that "it is 
entitled to the conditional use permit...." Plaintiff cannot make such a showing, and 
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moreover, it need not make such showing for a Takings claim. It is time to address the 
Takings issue. The County has decided that plaintiff cannot operate a gravel pit on its 
land and a trial is now needed to determine whether that decision constitutes a Taking 
under the Utah and U.S. Constitutions. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reason stated herein and in plaintiffs initial brief, Plain tiff-Appellant 
Diamond B-Y Ranches respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's 
decision summary judgment order and remand this case for a trial on the merits. 
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